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THE MORAL POLITICS OF SOCIAL 
CONTROL: POLITICAL CULTURE AND 
ORDINARY CRIME IN CUBA 
Deborah M. Weissman & Marsha Weissman* 
[Y]our ideals are too high . . . . An idea that is so high that it is beyond 
reach of the real is not very useful . . . . What you need here among the 
Cubans is a desire to make money, to found great enterprises, and to 
carry on the prosperity of this beautiful island, and the young Cubans 
ought, most of them, to begin in business . . . . The right of property 
and the motive for accumulation, next to the right of liberty, is the basis 
of all modern, successful civilization, and until you have a community 
of political influence and control which is affected by the conserving 
influences of property and property ownership, successful popular gov-
ernment is impossible.1 
[T]he moral factors, the factors of conscience, the cultural factors are 
irreplaceable under socialism. We should not think, even for a minute, 
that we are going to solve with money those problems that only the 
conscience can resolve. What we should do is use material incentives 
intelligently and combine them with moral stimuli, use them as rein-
forcers. We should not believe for an instant that now we can manage 
today’s man, the socialist man, by virtue of material incentives exclu-
sively, because material incentives do not have the attraction here that 
they have under capitalism where everything depends—life and 
death—upon the money in one’s pocket.2 
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 1. William Howard Taft, Provisional Governor of Cuba, Address at the Opening 
Exercises of the National University of Habana (Oct. 1, 1906). 
 2. Fidel Castro, Cuban Prime Minister, Address at the Closing Ceremony of the 13th 
Congress of the Central Organization of Cuban Workers (Nov. 16, 1973). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Cuban revolution has been described as “the longest running so-
cial experiment” in history—one not well-received in the United States.3 
The U.S. government responded to the revolution first with suspicion and 
then with hostility. Initially, the United States was most concerned by the 
close geographical proximity of a Soviet Union-allied socialist govern-
ment, as well as the possibility of Cuban influence in Latin America. In 
the post-Cold War years, journalists and pundits focused their commen-
tary on Cuba’s lack of democratic political institutions, human rights vi-
olations, and a pathological obsession with the Castro brothers.4 Even 
though the current administration has acknowledged the failure of U.S. 
policy with respect to Cuba, no substantive changes have been an-
nounced.5 As a result, the narrative of Cuba in the United States contin-
ues to dwell almost exclusively on political repression and economic 
failure.6 
The Cuban revolution, however, is a complex process—one that defies 
facile explanations. Subscribing to the perspective offered by social 
scientists who urge “a more nuanced view” of Cuba,7 we undertake an 
examination of a specific facet of the Cuban revolution in this Article: 
the Cuban approach to ordinary crime. While other scholars have ad-
dressed Cuba’s criminal justice system by focusing on formal legal sub-
stance, procedural matters, and socialist legality, this Article provides an 
alternative opportunity to examine commonly held views about socialist 
governance.8 Perhaps more importantly, it provides insights into the 
                                                                                                             
 3. The Cuba Studies Trust, International Institute for the Study of Cuba, 
http://www.cubastudiestrust.org/plan.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2010). 
 4. See Saul Landau, U.S. Media Images of Postrevolutionary Cuba: Shaped by Gov-
ernment Policy and Commercial Grammar, LATIN AM. PERSP., July 2006, at 118. 
 5. On April 13, 2009, the White House announced the easing of some travel and 
remittance restrictions for Cuban-American families. Press Release, The White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the Cuban People (Apr. 13, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-Reaching-
out-to-the-Cuban-people/; see also Mark Landler, Clinton Impresses Foreign Audiences 
by Saying U.S. Policies Have Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at A4. 
 6. Landau, supra note 4, at 122 (critiquing reports that “pose outdated and ethnocen-
tric questions” related to Cuba’s failure to adopt U.S. standards); see also Associated 
Press, Cuba: Dispute on Castro’s Intent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at A13 (noting cur-
rent U.S. demands that Cuba address human rights and political prisoners). 
 7. Alexander I. Gray & Antoni Kapcia, Introduction: Responding to Crisis at the 
Grass Roots, in THE CHANGING DYNAMIC OF CUBAN CIVIL SOCIETY 1, 8 (Alexander I. 
Gray & Antoni Kapcia eds., 2008).   
 8. See Gerard J. Clark, The Legal Profession in Cuba, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. 
REV. 413, 436; Erik Luna, Cuban Criminal Justice and the Ideal of Good Governance, 14 
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ways in which political culture and social controls interact to produce a 
coherent and generally successful policy response to crime. In fact, Cu-
ban methods have resulted in noteworthy developments within a socialist 
system that has to do as much with traditions of political culture as it 
does with Marxist ideology. That Cuba has succeeded in reducing re-
liance on formal penal sanctions and lowered crime rates invites compar-
ison with the United States, where strategies of community controls as an 
alternative to incarceration have met with less success.9 
This Article focuses on social controls designed to regulate two types 
of criminal behavior related to family structures, households, and neigh-
borhoods: domestic violence between intimate partners and juvenile de-
linquency.10 These types of complex social deviancies may be catego-
rized as “ordinary crime,” as distinguished from “political crime” or 
crimes of a political nature.11 These are contentious terms, of course, the 
boundaries of which are often difficult to establish within the realm of 
nation states and in international legal fora.12 That ordinary crimes may 
be considered political, and political crimes may be considered ordinary, 
suggests that these terms are often malleable and lend themselves to easy 
manipulation.13 This is as true in Cuba as it is in the United States and 
elsewhere.14 Furthermore, many feminist scholars have focused on the 
                                                                                                             
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 529, 531, 554 (2004); Erik Luna, A Place for Com-
parative Criminal Procedure, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 277, 302–03 (2003/2004). 
 9. Marguerite Rose Jiménez, The Political Economy of Leisure, in A 
CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER: REINVENTING THE REVOLUTION 146, 147 (Philip Brenner 
et al. eds., 2008) (noting low crime rates based on a study of the tourism industry). See 
generally Marsha Weissman, Aspiring to the Impracticable: Alternatives to Incarceration 
in the Era of Mass Incarceration, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235 (2009). 
 10. The authors use the term “domestic violence”—a less than ideal term—as op-
posed to “gender violence” because of this Article’s focus on violence between intimate 
partners within the family, and to distinguish such violence from violence against women 
outside of the home or family. 
 11. Rachel Monaghan & Suzanne McLaughlin, Informal Justice in the City, 10 SPACE 
& POLITY 171, 172 (2006) (noting, for example, the different categories used by paramili-
taries in Northern Ireland for purposes of punishment). 
 12. Marco Roscini, Great Expectations: The Implementation of the Rome Statute in 
Italy, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 493, 510 n.55 (2007) (defining political crimes as including 
ordinary crimes effected for political reasons); Aimée J. Buckland, Comment, Offending 
Officials: Former Government Actors and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 
94 CAL. L. REV. 423, 441 (2006) (defining “a relative political offense” as “a common 
crime pursued with a political purpose”). 
 13. Matthew Hannah, Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a 
Geographical Imagination of Power/Knowledge, 96 ANN. ASSOC. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 
622, 626 (2006). 
 14. José E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 405, 437 (2003) (noting U.S. efforts to convince other states to treat cer-
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political nature of crimes of domestic violence while scholars of racism 
have called attention to the political dimensions of youth and crime in the 
criminal justice system. 
With these caveats in mind, this Article examines the participatory 
networks through which Cubans exercise and experience social control 
over ordinary crime.15 Part I examines notions of public morality, the 
historical antecedents of Cuban political culture, and the relevance of 
these topics to ordinary crime control—all from a sociolegal perspec-
tive—in order to argue that values associated with Cuban liberation 
processes in the nineteenth century affected the current formation of 
commonly-shared ideals and the development of social consensus. These 
nineteenth century values incorporated an ethic based on the proposition 
of the perfectability of human beings through participation in organiza-
tions and civic associations, which provided the rationale for convoca-
tion: to make common cause, to share common purpose, and to develop 
consciousness of solidarity. 
Part II reviews Cuban theories of social control, detailing how mass 
organizations and civil society associations act to influence a culture of 
citizen responsibility in the realm of crime prevention and how these ent-
ities facilitate the exercise of that responsibility. This discussion will 
demonstrate how organizational processes promote community solidarity 
and, thus, provide the moral basis for neighborhood involvement in and 
mitigation of the day-to-day conditions that often contribute to disaffec-
tion and deviance.16 
Next, Part III serves as a case study that demonstrates how a culture of 
civic responsibility shapes citizens’ identifications of, and responses to 
domestic violence and juvenile delinquency. The effort to achieve gender 
equality serves as the framework in which Cubans address the problems 
of violence against women, efforts that cannot be separated from crime 
control strategies. Similarly, the exalted social status of youth in Cuban 
culture shapes the approach to juvenile crime. This Part examines both 
informal and formal legal responses to domestic violence and juvenile 
delinquency, both of which are shaped by values that eschew criminal 
sanctions as a useful response. 
                                                                                                             
tain terrorist acts as ordinary crimes that could be handled in their courts as well as ours); 
Hannah, supra note 13. 
 15. Our research, as well as that of others who have examined the Cuban criminal 
justice system, confirms the validity of a working differentiation between ordinary crimes 
(common crimes that include such offenses as murder, robbery, assault, theft, and those 
studied here) and political crime (crimes that are perceived to be threats to national secu-
rity). See sources cited supra note 8. 
 16. See infra Part II(B)(2). 
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Finally, in order to emphasize the significance of political culture as a 
determinant of social controls, Part IV draws comparisons between crime 
control measures in Cuba and the United States. While imposition of 
state sanctions has been the dominant approach to crime in the United 
States, this discussion will focus on Alternatives to Incarceration 
(“ATI”)—U.S. community-based initiatives that incorporate many pre-
mises and practices similar to Cuban participatory mechanisms of crime 
control. This is to illustrate that the success of such programs hinges on 
political culture. In the United States, ATI programs function within the 
shadow of a carceral state marked by decades of declining social capital. 
We argue that this backdrop explains why Cuba can rely on community 
norms to control crime more effectively than the United States. 
The fieldwork for this Article was completed over a period of five 
years (from 2002 to 2007), during which one or both of the authors tra-
veled to Cuba.17 We met with academics, members of the Ministry of 
Justice, diplomats, members of prevention commissions, government and 
private lawyers (including prosecutors and defense attorneys), physi-
cians, nurses, social workers, high school students, members of the Cu-
ban Federation for Women, and members of the Committees for the De-
fense of the Revolution. We attended meetings and assemblies, visited 
health clinics and schools, and observed daily life in Havana as well as 
other parts of Cuba. 
I. THE DETERMINANTS OF CUBAN SOCIAL CONTROL 
The determinants of social control in Cuba have their origins in early 
nineteenth century philosophies, which were carried forward and dee-
pened with urgency from Cuba’s successive wars for independence from 
Spain to the revolution of 1959. This Part describes this historical trajec-
tory and the resulting development of a particular political culture 
steeped in notions of shared social duty and moral obligations and rea-
lized through the imperative of collective participation. Civic virtue is 
expressed through collective endeavors, including efforts toward improv-
ing the wellbeing of those whose behavior stands outside norms of res-
pectability. It is this feature of Cuban political culture that informs and 
influences participatory mechanisms deployed in crime control. 
                                                                                                             
 17. Because of the adverse impact of U.S.-Cuban intergovernmental relations on 
sociolegal research, we identify, for the most part, the profession, position, or discipline 
of the persons with whom we met, and the date when and location where we met them. 
For more on the impact of the U.S.-Cuban relations on scholarly research, see Jorge I. 
Domínguez, Revolution and Its Aftermath in Cuba, 43 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 225, 226, 
238–39 (2008). 
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A. Moralism as Political Culture 
Scholars have given justifiable attention to the antecedents of the Cu-
ban revolution as a culmination of a historical process with roots in the 
nineteenth century. Writing about the larger meaning of the Cuban revo-
lutionary tradition, historian Louis A. Pérez, Jr. observed that “the power 
of the past [gives] purpose to the present.”18 This statement serves as a 
guide to understanding much about contemporary Cuba. The experiences 
of the wars for independence from Spain in the nineteenth century and 
the repeated mobilizations against the United States in the twentieth cen-
tury broadly inform the project of revolution after 1959. 
Among the pre-revolutionary ideals that influenced the revolution was 
the belief in an integrated social order based on virtue, personal trans-
formation, and sacrifice for nation (patria).19 During the nineteenth cen-
tury, a particular ethos of moralism developed and served as the cultural 
matrix from which Cuban identity was formed.20 Philosopher Félix Vare-
la—whose early nineteenth century writings have been described as the 
“bible of Cuban identity”—preached an “emancipatory moralism” and 
insisted that morality in Cuba would be measured by willingness to be 
“useful to the fatherland.”21 Sixty years later, José Martí addressed the 
moral meanings of national independence, calling for a fundamental eth-
ical change and transformation of Cuban political culture. “It is to the 
substance of these matters that we are going, rather than to the forms,” 
said Marti. “It is a case of changing a nation’s soul, [its] entire way of 
thinking and acting, and not just [its] external clothes.”22 Martí’s invoca-
tion of a “moral republic” emanated from what has been described as a 
“missionary impulse” of historic dimensions that emphasized social jus-
                                                                                                             
 18. LOUIS A. PÉREZ JR., THE WAR OF 1898, at 126 (1998); see also David Rieff, Cuba 
Refrozen, FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 1996,  at 62, 62 (noting that Cuba’s “political culture 
is steeped in the legends of resistance and self-immolation of the nineteenth-century 
struggle for independence”). 
 19. JAMES J. PANCRAZIO, THE LOGIC OF FETISHISM: ALEJO CARPENTIER AND THE 
CUBAN TRADITION 158 (2004); Antoni Kapcia, One Hundred Years of Solitude: 1898 and 
1998 in the Cuban Search for National Identity, in SPAIN’S 1898 CRISIS: 
REGENERATIONISM, MODERNISM, POST-COLONIALISM 229, 236 (Joseph Harrison & Alan 
Hoyle eds., 2000); Nelson P. Valdés, Cuban Political Culture: Between Betrayal and 
Death, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION 207, 214 (Sandor Halebsky 
& John M. Kirk eds., 1992) (citing FÉLIX VARELA, 1 LECCIONES DE FILOSOFÍA). 
 20. See sources cited id. 
 21. See sources cited supra note 19. 
 22. 5 JOSÉ MARTÍ, 5 OBRAS COMPLETAS [COMPLETE WORKS] 368–69 (1963), quota-
tion translated in Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk, Introduction, in CUBA: TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS OF REVOLUTION, 1959 TO 1984 at 3, 7–8 (Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk 
eds., 1985). 
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tice and redemption for the benefit of all Cubans.23 The ideal of a moral 
republic, based on an ethic of honor, dignity, and decorum, seized hold 
of the Cuban imagination. This ideal endured as a sentiment to which 
subsequent generations subscribed, and it shaped the discursive frame-
work in which Cuban political culture developed.24 
With the triumph of the revolution, Cubans moved purposefully to es-
tablish a society in accordance with nineteenth century ideals of self-
sacrifice, collective duty, and civic participation. Indeed, Cuban scholars 
have described the revolution as the “resurrection of political and moral 
charisma” and an “ethical regeneration” derived from a “pre-existing 
moralistic movement that denounced and fought against selfish inter-
ests.”25 Such idealism is the lens through which historic cultural concepts 
of social duty and moral responsibility have provided the normative con-
text of political change. 
All political systems are shaped, to varying degrees, by historically-
determined ethical paradigms. In the United States, early foundational 
concerns focused on conceptions of republicanism and the proposition of 
civic virtue as individual initiative over State intervention. Patriotism is 
celebrated as freedom of the individual. In contrast, the Cuban revolution 
drew upon a tradition of civic virtue as a collective effort to achieve col-
lective redemption in which the State intervened as a matter of moral 
duty to guarantee social justice.26 The revolution’s commitment to fulfil-
ling basic needs, for example, drew explicitly upon notions of moralism 
as inspiration for the radical transformation of society.27 Fidel Castro 
                                                                                                             
 23. See Archibald R.M. Ritter, The Transferability of Socioeconomic Development 
Models of Revolutionary Cuba, 7 CUBAN STUDIES/ESTUDIOS CUBANOS 183, 183 (1977); 
LOUIS A. PÉREZ, JR., CUBA BETWEEN EMPIRES: 1878–1902, at 106–07 (1983). 
 24. Valdés, supra note 19, at 214. 
 25. Nelson P. Valdés, The Revolutionary and Political Content of Fidel Castro’s 
Charismatic Authority, in A CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER: REINVENTING THE REV- 
OLUTION 27, 31 (Philip Brenner et al. eds., 2008). 
 26. Rafael Hernández & Haroldo Dilla, Political Culture and Popular Participation 
in Cuba, LATIN AM. PERSP., Spring 1992, at 38, 42–43 (Jennifer Dugan Abbassi & Jean 
Díaz trans.1991) (equality as Cuba’s ideological culture). 
 27. Fidel Castro, Cuba Prime Minister, Address before the General Assembly of the 
People of Cuba (Sept. 2, 1960), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/1960/ 
[hereinafter Castro General Assembly Speech] (relying on a vigorously moral people to 
achieve the goals of the revolution as expressed in the Havana Declaration); Fidel Castro, 
Cuba Prime Minister, Castro Speaks on Literacy Campaign (Aug. 17, 1961) (equating 
literacy campaigns with moral obligations), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/ 
castro/db/1961/19610817.html [hereinafter Castro Literacy Campaign Speech]; Fidel 
Castro, Cuba Prime Minister, Castro’s Aviation Day Speech (Apr. 18, 1963) (linking 
morality with patriotism), available at http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/ 
1963/ [hereinafter Castro Aviation Day Speech]; see also Miguel Martinez-Saenz, Che 
2010] SOCIAL CONTROL AND CRIME IN CUBA 319 
made frequent references to the virtues of personal sacrifice for the bene-
fit of the collective good in order to encourage Cubans to undertake vo-
lunteer work, routinely offering reminders that personal worth is derived 
from service, not self-interest.28 His exhortations resonated precisely be-
cause they drew upon a legacy derived from the nineteenth-century libe-
ration project. Appeals not only to Marxism but to morality with antece-
dents in the nineteenth century must be understood as motivating the 
shaping of contemporary Cuba, and, as demonstrated below, appeals to 
morality permeate Cuban approaches to ordinary crime.29 
B. Moralism Actualized: Participation as Moral Social Conduct 
Cuban traditions of moralism are more than a theoretical construct; 
moralism must function to achieve a purpose. Values are practiced as 
part of daily life in the form of citizen participation and social organiza-
tion. Participatory mechanisms are the means by which Cubans exercise 
their “place-bound source of self-identification” (that is, consciousness 
of being Cuban, or, conciencia) and transact the moral paradigm to ad-
vance the ideals of the revolution.30 Programs to build housing, schools, 
and medical facilities, improve transportation, and develop agriculture 
require volunteers working in mass organizations.31 
That most Cubans have been involved in some sort of campaign to im-
plement Cuban-style socioeconomic development suggests that means 
have served as ends, and that the realization of the goals of any particular 
campaign acted to expand citizen participation in the revolution.32 In-
                                                                                                             
Guevara’s New Man: Embodying a Communitarian Attitude, LATIN AM. PERSP., Nov 
2004, at 15, 21. 
 28. Valdés, supra note 25; Castro General Assembly Speech, supra note 27; Castro 
Literacy Campaign Speech, supra note 27; Castro Aviation Day Speech, supra note 27. 
 29. Valdés, supra note 19, at 213. 
 30. LOUIS A. PÉREZ, JR., CUBA: BETWEEN REFORM AND REVOLUTION 340 (2d ed. 
1995) [hereinafter PÉREZ, JR., CUBA]; Louis A. Pérez Jr., Thinking Back on Cuba’s Fu-
ture: The Logic of Patria, NACLA REP. ON THE AM., Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 12, 13 (2009). 
The importance of participatory mechanisms by which Cuba’s social problems are en-
countered is noted extensively in the literature. See CAROLLEE BENGELSDORF, THE 
PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY IN CUBA: BETWEEN VISION AND REALITY 8 (1994); RICHARD R. 
FAGEN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN CUBA 2 (1969); Arthur MacE-
wan, Why is Cuba Different?, in CUBA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF REVOLUTION, 1959 TO 
1984, at 420, 420–21 (Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds., 1985). 
 31. Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk, Introduction, in CUBA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 
OF REVOLUTION, 1959 TO 1984 at 3, 7–8 (Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds., 1985); 
Hernández & Dilla, supra note 26, at 42. 
 32. BENGELSDORF, supra note 30, at 86; see also On Celebrating the Cuban Revolu-
tion, LAT. AMER. PERSP., Jan 2009, at 5, 11 (2009) (noting the high rate of Cuban partici-
pation in mass organizations). 
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deed, some scholars have insisted that the larger significance of the Cu-
ban revolution has been its ability to continually mobilize the populace 
through mass organizations.33 As one Cuban political scientist has writ-
ten, citizen collaboration functions as the Cuban form of democracy, that 
is, “a system on which power is constructed and legitimated by citizen 
representation and participation.”34 Popular participation has been “both 
motive and motor” of the revolutionary effort, as well as the measure of 
historic traditions of morality and revolutionary citizenship.35 
Cuban society therefore can be best understood as the interdependent 
relationship between consciousness and cultural practices manifested as 
popular participation. Participatory mechanisms serve as the means by 
which individuals often gain access to resources and in turn become in-
vested in relationships of interdependencies and mutual obligations.36 
These mechanisms serve as the networks where repeated cooperative 
interactions enhance personal connections and neighborliness and 
through which the fabric of social trust is woven. With respect to the fo-
cus of this Article, these participatory structures serve as the foundations 
of social control, mediating between ecological conditions, community 
disorder, and crime.37 
II. THE MACHINERY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
This Part examines the specific ways Cuban participatory structures af-
fect social controls. It begins with an overview of approaches to social 
controls—these approaches being the comprehensive strategies used to 
deter behaviors deemed pernicious to stability and order.38 Social con-
                                                                                                             
 33. BENGELSDORF, supra note 30, at 85; FAGEN, supra note 30, at 1–2; see also infra 
Part II(B)(1). 
 34. Rafael Hernández, On Cuban Democracy: Cuba and the Democratic Culture, in 
A CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER: REINVENTING THE REVOLUTION 74, 76 (Philip Brenner 
et al. eds., 2008). 
 35. FAGEN, supra note 30, at 7. 
 36. Ulla V. Bondeson, Levels of Punitiveness in Scandinavia: Description and Expla-
nations, in THE NEW PUNITIVENESS: TRENDS, THEORIES, PERSPECTIVES 189, 195 (John 
Pratt et al. eds., 2005) (discussing high levels of political participation in Scandinavian 
countries). 
 37. Todd R. Clear & Dina R. Rose, Individual Sentencing Practices and Aggregate 
Social Problems, in CRIME CONTROL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE DELICATE BALANCE 27, 
39 (Darnell F. Hawkins et al. eds., 2003). 
 38. STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 1 (1985); see also John R. Sutton, 
Rethinking Social Control, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 943 (1996) (reviewing THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio 
eds., 1991)) (“In the contemporary sociolegal literature, few concepts are invoked more 
frequently, and with less clarity of meaning and purpose, than that of social control.”). 
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trols include formal and informal strategies that emerge from local com-
munities, government, or the market.39 As a means of governance, they 
possess “the capacity of a social unit to regulate itself according to de-
sired principles—to realize collective, as opposed to forced, goals.”40 
Cuban participatory organizations, and, particularly, their micro-level 
practices, create the means for social control and influence the processes 
for responding to crime.41 Participation in Cuban mass and local organi-
zations both fosters an awareness of the conditions that often cause crime 
and builds community relationships essential to social control mechan-
isms.42 
A. Social Controls and Ordinary Crime in Cuba 
The control of crime is a basic function of a well-ordered society. Al-
though there are a number of theories that seek to explain criminal beha-
vior, two concepts stand as organizing principles. The first approach—
often referred to as Individual or Rational Choice Theory—proposes that 
deviant behavior is a function of individual choice.43 This perspective 
suggests criminals make rational choices among alternative courses of 
action (i.e., “crime is a decision not a disease”).44 The second approach 
posits that deviant behavior is socially structured and that poor people 
                                                                                                             
 39. Joachim J. Savelsberg, Cultures of Control in Contemporary Society, 27 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 685, 686, 708 (2002) (reviewing DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF 
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001)) (noting a di-
versity of approaches to social controls). 
 40. Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of 
Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 
610 (1999) (citing Morris Janowitz, Sociological Theory and Social Control, 81 AM. J. 
SOC. 82, 87 (1975)); see also John Hasnas, The Depoliticization of Law, 9 THEORETICAL 
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 41. See Manuel A. Gómez, All in the Family: The Influence of Social Networks on 
Dispute Processing (A Case Study of a Developing Economy), 36 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
291, 302–04 (describing how social conditions may influence the culture of dispute 
processes). 
 42. James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM . J. 
SOC. S. 95, 102–04 (1988) (describing social capital as interpersonal relationships and 
institutional linkages through which obligations and expectations are facilitated, norms 
and sanctions developed, and where people make use of each other’s skills and know-
ledge). 
 43. See generally Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, Enduring Individual Dif-
ferences and Rational Choice Theories of Crime, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 467 (1993). 
 44. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 198 (2001); John Hagan, Introduction: Crime in Social and 
Legal Context, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 255, 255 (1993) (the ethos of individualism focuses 
on crime as a function of the individual). 
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and racial minorities are more likely to be identified as criminals because 
of the state of powerlessness and the socioeconomic disadvantages they 
suffer.45 Under this approach, crime is the direct and indirect result of 
social conditions, including historical circumstances, political conditions, 
and economic forces.46 
Rational Choice Theory is associated with a course of action less tole-
rant of crime and more punitive toward acts defined as criminal. In this 
theory, the purpose of social controls is to isolate and sanction those in-
dividuals who will not and/or cannot control their own conduct, and to 
subject such individuals to strict controls.47 Rational Choice Theory also 
minimizes responsibility or obligation on the part of society in general 
for the actions of criminals.48 
In contrast, the social structure theory adopts the social control re-
sponse that David Garland has called a “broader solidarity project.”49 
This theory focuses on the macro political conditions and economic con-
cerns, and the development of a social agenda that focuses on poverty 
prevention, economic assistance, and distribution of services.50 The cir-
cumstances of communities in which offenders reside are central points 
of consideration and interest.51 
The Cuban approach to social control of crime follows the structural 
approach. It is based on the premise that ordinary crime is the result of 
particular social conditions and is therefore responsive to solutions me-
diated through mass and local organizations.52 Cuban jurists approach 
ordinary crime—especially domestic violence and juvenile delinquen-
cy—in the context of political, social, and economic conditions, and they 
draw on structural-based theoretical foundations for guidance.53 They 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. GARLAND, supra note 44, at 198. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 199. 
 50. Id.; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and 
Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 173 (2008). 
 51. Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law’s Uncer-
tain Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759 (2005) (describing this approach as a 
function of the social welfare system that mitigates unemployment and poverty). 
 52. Of course, Cuba’s consideration of the social causes of crime is not unique. See 
GARLAND, supra note 44, at 188 (describing an approach used for much of the 20th cen-
tury in the United States and Great Britain). 
 53. See Caridad Navarrete Calderón, Early Preventing Work in Groups of Prevention 
of the Popular Councils 3 (2002) (noting a consensus about the inefficiencies of formal 
penal system controls) (on file with author); Euclides Catá Guilarte, Cuban Social Policy 
and Disadvantaged Social Groups, in SOCIAL WORK IN CUBA AND SWEDEN 93, 101 
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believe the proper response to these structural problems is to improve the 
human condition (“lucha por la formación de un hombre mejor”) 
through distribution of services by way of egalitarian initiatives.54 At the 
same time, criminologists draw on theories of collectively enacted social 
agency whereby individual participation is central to achieving the 
shared public goal of crime prevention. 
Individuals who transgress well-settled norms are often provided a 
range of services as a front-line response.55 Criminologists proceed from 
the premise that experts, in collaboration with the community, are duty-
bound to promote human values within each individual, including those 
with criminal predilections.56 Criminals are recognized as possessing 
both strengths and weaknesses—they might threaten the social order, but 
with some intervention, they may become productive members of socie-
ty.57 To this end, Cubans have established prevention commissions at 
both the national and local levels that implement strategies to deter crim-
inal behavior and thereby lessen the need to exclude from society those 
who manifest criminal tendencies.58 
Cuban criminologists have been more concerned with examining crime 
as an outgrowth of poverty and market forces than with contemplating 
deterrence.59 Cuba’s Penal Code, amended in 1979 for the first time in 
forty years, eliminated those penal norms that “no longer correspond 
                                                                                                             
(Sven-Axel Månsson & Clotilde Proveyer Cervantes eds., 2005); Ofelia de los Milagros 
García Cueto, La Violencia, Un Mal Sin Fronteras [Violence, A Harm without Borders], 
6 REVISTA DE CIENCIAS MÉDICAS LA HABANA (2000), available at http://www.cpicmha. 
sld.cu/hab/vol6_2_00/hab010200.htm. 
 54. García Cueto, supra note 53. 
 55. Antoni Kapcia, Setting the Stage for a Discussion of Cuban Civil Society, in THE 
CHANGING DYNAMIC OF CUBAN CIVIL SOCIETY 20, 25, 27, 35–36 (Alexander I. Gray & 
Antoni Kapcia eds., 2008) (noting efforts to work with even those considered enemies of 
the revolution). 
 56. Calderón, supra note 53, at 16. 
 57. Patricia Grogg, Crime and Counterrevolution, CUBA UPDATE, Nov. 1991, at 30, 
31 (1991) (quoting Dr. Fernando Barral, noted Cuban psychiatrist and professor of crimi-
nology, who observed that Cuba’s concern with economic crime does not relate to private 
property, but with the “economic principle of socialist distribution”) (on file with author); 
Interview with sociologist in Havana, Cuba (Oct. 15, 2005). 
 58. Sheryl L. Lutjens, Schooling and “Clean Streets” in Socialist Cuba: Children 
and the Special Period, in CHILDREN ON THE STREETS OF THE AMERICAS: GLOBALIZATION, 
HOMELESSNESS AND EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, BRAZIL AND CUBA 55, 58 (Ros-
lyn Arlin Mickelson ed., 2000) (referencing prevention commission systems established 
through Decree Laws beginning in the early 1980s). 
 59. See generally Bondeson, supra note 36, at 194 (observing that countries that em-
phasize a welfare model are likely to have less stringent penal systems); Grogg, supra 
note 57. 
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with the reality of [Cuban] economic, social and political develop-
ment.”60 Raúl Gómez Treto, senior advisor to the Cuban Ministry of Jus-
tice and President of the Cuban Society for Civil and Family Law, de-
scribed the 1979 amendments as a paradigm shift that “depenalized” cer-
tain crimes—particularly those related to juveniles and families—and re-
designated them as antisocial actions committed as a consequence of 
economic need or lack of education.61 
Other reforms demonstrate that Cubans have reconsidered the efficacy 
of criminalization and punishment toward deterrence of ordinary crime. 
By the early 1980s, Cuba had again moved purposefully to decriminalize 
a number of offenses by changing the character of criminal laws and re-
ducing the use of detention.62 Cuba later eliminated an additional host of 
petty offenses and codes of conduct from the Penal Code, while the pe-
nalties for other offenses were reduced from imprisonment to fines and 
education programs.63 
Cuban criminologists tend to approach crime control from pragmatic 
and humanitarian perspectives. Professor Caridad Navarette Calderón, 
one of Cuba’s foremost criminologists, describes her research as “huma-
nistic social projects” and emphasizes the need to embed problem-
solving skills in communities rather than impose punitive responses via 
formal criminal justice institutions.64 Her research aims to shift the social 
                                                                                                             
 60. DEBRA EVENSON, REVOLUTION IN THE BALANCE 148 (1994). 
 61. Raúl Gómez Treto, Thirty Years of Cuban Revolutionary Penal Law, LATIN AM. 
PERSP., Spring 1991, at 114, 118. 
 62. MARJORIE S. ZATZ, PRODUCING LEGALITY: LAW AND SOCIALISM IN CUBA 71 
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 64. Interview with Dr. Caridad Navarrete Calderón in Havana, Cuba (Oct. 12, 2005); 
see also Caridad Navarrete Calderón, Caracterización Criminológica Victimológica de 
Mujeres Comisoras de Lesiones de Ciudad de la Habana [Criminological Victimological 
Characterization of Women Assaulters in Havana], ILANUD: REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO 
LATINOAMERICANO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LA PREVENCIÓN DEL DELITO Y EL 
TRATAMIENTO DEL DELICUENTE, 2006, at 235, 239–40, available at http://ilanud.or.cr/ 
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James H. McDonald, Structural Control and Ideology Consistency: Changes in the Form 
and Content of Cuban Criminal Law, in MAKING LAW: THE STATE, THE LAW AND 
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meanings of crime, encourage mutual aid, and improve the distribution 
of goods and services in order to ameliorate conditions commonly asso-
ciated with crime and deviance.65 
Policymakers now subscribe to this belief in community mediation as 
social control and encourage its exercise in multiple spheres—
particularly by the popular organizations assigned to civic tasks—as a 
form of preventative intervention.66 
B. Participatory Mechanisms as a Means of Social Control 
1. Overview of Cuban Organizations 
The Cuban revolution established four principal mass organizations, all 
of which function within the framework of the Cuban approach to social 
controls as a means of mobilizing the public to carry out centrally deter-
mined objectives. They include the Committees for the Defense of the 
Revolution (“CDR”), the Federation of Cuban Women (“FMC”), the 
Confederation of Cuban Workers (“CTC”), and the National Organiza-
tion of Small Agriculturists (“ANAP”).67 Since the revolution, the CDRs 
have provided vigilance against counter-revolutionary activity and crime 
in neighborhoods and work places.68 The FMC’s initial objective was to 
                                                                                                             
STRUCTURAL CONTRADICTIONS 127, 141 (William J. Chambliss & Marjorie S. Zatz eds., 
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 65. Berta E. Hernández-Truyol, Cuba and Good Governance, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
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LATIN AM. PERSP., May 2002, at 3, 4 (noting that in 2001, the president of the World 
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 66. Interview with Dr. Caridad Navarrete Calderón, supra note 64; see also COHEN, 
supra note 38, at 127, 265 (describing how community controls can respond to “genuine 
psychic and social needs”); Fagan & Meares, supra note 50, at 186–87 (noting that ways 
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the degree of criminal behavior in that community). 
 67. For a thorough treatment of Cuban mass organizations, see generally FAGEN, 
supra note 30. 
 68. See Rhoda Pearl Rabkin, Cuban Political Structure: Vanguard Party and the 
Masses, in CUBA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF REVOLUTION, 1959 TO 1984, at 251, 263 (San-
dor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds., 1985). 
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incorporate women into the realm of productive labor.69 Currently, the 
FMC establishes programs to assist women and families with many fa-
cets of day-to-day life, including health concerns, family violence, gend-
er discrimination, educational programs, and employment issues.70 The 
CTC, described as “representative of the entire working class of Cuba,” 
works to further Cuba’s post-1959 political, social, and economic agen-
da, often through legislative proposals and initiatives.71 The ANAP 
sought to incorporate peasants and small farmers into the efforts to fulfill 
the objectives of the revolutionary project.72 
While much has been written about these organizations elsewhere, the 
relevant part for purposes of understanding the Cuban approach to ordi-
nary crime is the door-to-door and block-by-block processes by which 
these organizations operate.73 In order to carry out their overall mission 
and their individual tasks, they have created an infrastructure that also 
serves as the foundation for social controls and crime prevention. 
In addition to these mass organizations, over 2,000 local civic associa-
tions have emerged across the island over the past fifteen years, largely 
in response to the post-Soviet economic crisis.74 These civic associations 
include neighborhood development associations, religious groups, and 
fraternal, cultural, and sports organizations.75 They have obtained official 
support due to their their commitment to national norms and their ability 
to respond to crisis situations and fulfill various critical needs that are left 
                                                                                                             
 69. Lois M. Smith & Alfred Padula, The Cuban Family in the 1980s, in 
TRANSFORMATION AND STRUGGLE: CUBA FACES THE 1990S, at 175, 178 (Sandor Halebsky 
& John M. Kirk, eds. 1990). 
 70. See the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences: Addendum: Re-
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 72. PÉREZ, JR., CUBA, supra note 30, at 330. 
 73. See infra Part II(B)(2). 
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unattended by a weakened centralized bureaucracy.76 Local organizations 
have become the sites of debates, particularly debates as to what are the 
most efficient means of resolving problems caused by shortages and the 
decline in general day-to-day living conditions.77 As neighborhood 
projects, they incorporate vulnerable populations into community self-
help endeavors and social service initiatives.78 Many of the local organi-
zations function as social science laboratories.79 
Mass and local organizations function at all levels of society: within 
the family and inside households, in neighborhoods and at workplaces. 
These organizations encourage a dynamic process of citizen-to-citizen 
involvement and address the conditions that contribute to crime. It is out 
of these very structures that the logic of social controls and crime in Cu-
ba emerges. The focus is on fixing the broken window rather than crimi-
nalizing the window breaker.80 
2. Social Capital and Crime Prevention through  
Distribution of Public Goods 
Most Cuban organizations were designed to facilitate cooperative ac-
tion associated with improving the quality of day-to-day life of individu-
als and communities. As such, they contribute to the development of so-
cial capital—the means by which individuals and groups obtain material 
and social benefits through network connections and participation in civ-
ic organizations.81 Social capital not only yields a broad range of re-
sources for use and exchange by citizen participants, but has also been 
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demonstrated to reduce rates of crime by creating community trust and 
investing in social welfare through the distribution of public goods.82 
The mass organizations’ core projects clearly demonstrate these phe-
nomena. The functions to which Cuban organizations dedicate them-
selves—including economic development, housing construction and re-
pairs, and improvement of employment and workplace conditions—
directly develop social capital through network exchanges and citizen 
cooperation.83 The CDRs, the FMC, the ANAP, and the CTC engage 
citizens in the type of efforts that promote social welfare and improve 
living conditions, such as: literacy campaigns, door-to-door book distri-
butions, provision of daycare services, child development initiatives, 
school attendance programs, and educational programs for workers and 
farmers.84 
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Similarly, local groups such as the Neighborhood Transformation 
Workshops (Talleres de Transformación Integral del Barrio) assist with 
the distribution of health care services, workplace safety protections, and 
vaccination programs.85 They undertake public works projects to im-
prove street lighting and other physical conditions of neighborhoods.86 
They foster a sense of inclusion in community projects and enhance the 
processes of cooperative problem-solving.87 These organizations—both 
mass and local—address poor living conditions, lack of day-to-day re-
sources, limited education, and diminished economic opportunities, all of 
which are readily associated with crime.88 They bear directly on the con-
ditions that, when left unaddressed, often give way to community disre-
pair, family despair, and deviance. To the extent that Cuban organiza-
tions succeed in their goals, they also confer legitimacy on governmental 
initiatives and, thus, contribute to compliance with social and legal 
norms.89 
3. Collective Supervision and the Complexities of Categorizing Deviance 
Participatory structures function in two additional and related ways as 
a means of crime prevention via social control. First, they collectively 
supervise residents in cities and in rural areas throughout the island, often 
in ways that are directly related to crime control. Indeed, crime preven-
tion is a matter of specific concern to most organizations. Citizens often 
prefer to turn to the CDRs to remedy wrongs and resolve local disputes 
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rather than seek formal legal relief through the courts.90 The Talleres 
have become sites for intervention in family dysfunction and violence.91 
Similarly, for matters relating to ordinary crime, workers turn to the 
CTC in lieu of formal legal charges.92 For example, one of the most se-
rious problems presented to the CTC has been that of workplace theft. 
During Cuba’s Special Period,93 theft of state property increased, creat-
ing a significant burden on Cuba’s fragile economy that provoked an 
outcry for the imposition of harsh penalties.94 After consideration and 
debate, the CTC assumed a preventative approach that focused on reduc-
ing opportunities for pilfering and counseling workers, whose rehabilita-
tion was considered more important than punishment.95 
Even when not specifically addressing crime, mass organizations serve 
as sites where knowledge about crime and deviance is gained and from 
which responses are formulated.96 CDR volunteers have direct contact 
with residents, and are each responsible for a given neighborhood.97 
They rely on retired residents who are frequently at home and who take 
note of suspected criminal activity in their neighborhoods so that they 
may intervene before serious problems develop.98 The FMC has main-
tained what scholars have termed a “ubiquitous presence” in neighbor-
hoods; organizers go door-to-door visiting homes to fulfill their tasks and 
conduct studies and surveys.99 They are uniquely positioned to identify 
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community problems and gain knowledge of household dynamics.100 The 
Talleres rely on a social work case-management model and make use of 
the block-by-block infrastructure already put in place by the CDRs in 
order to provide services.101 They have also established research and 
evaluation teams to observe and report on neighborhood conditions.102 
These day-to-day encounters combine to form the participatory mechan-
isms by which Cubans collectively supervise one another from within 
groups of law-abiding individuals acting in bounded solidarity to pre-
serve order and protect the vulnerable.103 
The second explanation for how participatory structures facilitate 
crime prevention is that it becomes a more difficult proposition to ex-
clude individuals for deviant behavior in societies where members share 
deep commitments to sustaining communities and assume obligations for 
mutual wellbeing. John Braithwaite has described this mutual caretaking 
as a social corollary to such communal social structures.104 In this con-
text, “[T]he complex experience that people have of each other makes it 
more difficult to squeeze the identities of offenders into crude master 
categories of deviance.”105 Other scholars refer to the dynamic of “linked 
fate” as a phenomenon of empathy among community members that af-
fects responses to crime.106 
These dynamics describe circumstances in Cuba, where organizational 
processes bring individuals into close proximity to one another for pur-
poses of solidarity and support. Members engage with neighbors and co-
workers, and identify with each other’s daily problems, particularly the 
very circumstances that may give rise to disaffection and deviance.107 
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When community members identify deviant behavior, they are more 
likely to seek services than to punish. 
The methods by which the CTC carries out its functions provide an ex-
ample of the phenomenon of linked fate. CTC members collaborate to 
establish wages and set material incentives. In determining allocations, 
they consider not only worker productivity but also individual needs.108 
Through these deliberations, co-workers gain knowledge of family com-
position, living conditions, health, and other hardships and circums-
tances.109 A similar process takes place through ANAP’s deliberative 
processes, by which decisions are made as to how to allocate resources to 
support individual families.110 
These mutual dependencies act to reduce the traditional monopolistic 
control exercised by formal criminal justice systems over criminal beha-
vior. Because of the commonplace nature of civic participation in matters 
related to neighborhood wellbeing, the boundaries of participation are 
defined only vaguely and readily yield to intervention on behalf of indi-
viduals and families in lieu of resort to formal criminal justice mechan-
isms. 
This is not to suggest that these organizations always function con-
structively. Surveillance is at times an intrusive practice, one used as a 
mechanism of intimidation. It not infrequently passes into the realm of 
harassment.111 The CDRs have carried out repressive acts, such as de-
nouncing and detaining suspected counter-revolutionaries.112 Neighbors 
have informed on one another, often resulting in unwarranted accusa-
tions.113 The mass organizations have also suffered from corruption, offi-
                                                                                                             
(Alexander I. Gray & Antoni Kapcia eds., 2008) (noting that as a result of the Talleres, 
Cubans gain familiarity with the needs of their community); Gail Reed, From SiCKO to 
SALUD: The Truth About the Cuban Health Care System, HUFFINGTON POST, July 15, 
2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gail-reed/from-sicko-to-e_b_56308.html (describ-
ing nurses making house calls to check on the elderly and to remind people about their 
checkups). 
 108. Richard L. Harris, Bureaucracy Versus Democracy in Contemporary Cuba: An 
Assessment of Thirty Years of Organizational Development, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: 
CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION 77, 83 (Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds., 1992); 
Evenson, supra note 84, at 24; Zimbalist, supra note 84, at 219. 
 109. Lindenberg, supra note 84, at 35 (noting that services and housing were fairly 
distributed, taking into consideration workers’ “pressing needs”); Zimbalist, supra note 
84, at 220. 
 110. DOMÍNGUEZ, supra note 83, at 303; Gropas, supra note 84, at 264. 
 111. Benigno E. Aguirre, Social Control in Cuba, LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y, Summer 
2002, at 67, 78 (describing the Rapid Response Brigades that forcefully repressed activity 
deemed counter-revolutionary). 
 112. Id. 
 113. BENGELSDORF, supra note 30, at 85; FAGEN, supra note 30, at 96. 
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ciousness, and bureaucratic stagnation.114 Moreover, the success of these 
organizations has varied from neighborhood to neighborhood and has 
been hampered by the scarcity of material resources and local political 
leadership.115 But in matters related to the facets of everyday life, these 
organizations have been generally successful in controlling crime. They 
do so by improving living and working conditions, and fostering the ne-
cessary circumstances for the development among ordinary Cubans of 
empathetic relationships that impede the imposition of categorical stigma 
on those who exhibit deviant behavior.116 
III. ORDINARY CRIME: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY  
A review of the Cuban approach to domestic violence and juvenile de-
linquency serves as a case study of the ways political culture and social 
controls interact to produce a coherent and generally successful policy 
response to crime. 
Cubans have focused on promoting norms of gender equality and so-
cial solidarity as the principal means to deter violence against women. 
Cuban criminologists proceed from two assumptions—(1) education can 
change gender norms that contribute to domestic violence117 and (2) at-
tention to the material needs of households supports an environment 
conducive to stable, violence-free families.118 
Similarly, the dominant response to juvenile delinquency in Cuba has 
focused not on punishment but on prevention strategies that privilege the 
delivery of services to children, families, and communities. Cubans have 
been careful to avoid stigmatizing youth who exhibit deviant behavior. 
Instead, they emphasize social work methodologies as a means to attend 
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to family dynamics, child-rearing, and community activities that nurture 
and teach social values.119 
In both instances, formal legal responses eschew punitive crime control 
measures120—Cuba’s laws mandate prevention rather than punishment 
and are thus constitutive of the informal processes that serve as the pri-
mary means to address domestic violence and juvenile crimes. They pro-
duce normative changes and incorporate potential perpetrators into do-
minant social structures as a way to prevent criminal activity. 
A. Domestic Violence 
1. Gender Equality as a Framework121 
Cuban criminologists who specialize in domestic violence have argued 
that eradicating gender-based violence first requires the transformation of 
relationships between men and women, with a focus on women’s equali-
ty.122 An understanding of the Cuban approach to the former requires an 
examination of developments toward achieving the latter. 
Among the many things that changed in Cuba after 1959 was the ex-
panded presence and participation of women in public realms. New pos-
sibilities provided vast numbers of women with a new sense of purpose 
and significantly altered the gender determinants of daily life, at least 
during the early years. With the triumph of revolution, Cuba initiated a 
National Development Strategy to eliminate all forms of discrimination 
and to address women’s issues specifically.123 The FMC established day 
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care centers, laundries, state-run cafeterias, and take-out restaurants as 
part of an effort to socialize domestic work.124 
State-run television has altered programming narratives in an effort to 
change depictions of socially constructed gender roles in the home.125 
Educators revised school texts and educational curricula to depict women 
as fully capable persons integrated into all levels of society.126 Child de-
velopment experts have introduced new children’s play activities to dis-
mantle traditional roles assigned by sex.127 Cubans have increasingly ac-
cepted same-sex relationships, gay marriage, and transgendered identities 
while grappling with the problematic masculine discourse associated 
with the revolution and traditions of machismo.128 
Legal reforms have also served as an expression of gender equality. 
Although lacking enforcement mechanisms, the 1975 Cuban Family 
Code required an equal division of housework and child care between 
husbands and wives.129 The 1976 Constitution addressed women’s issues 
(particularly the problem of the double shift), established standards for 
marriage as an equal partnership, and proclaimed equal political, eco-
nomic, and social rights as between husbands and wives, and men and 
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women, generally.130 Labor laws similarly extended rights and protec-
tions to women.131 Cuba has led by example with regard to international 
protocols and gender-based equality. It was the first country to sign the 
Convention to End Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”)132 and it 
subsequently signed the treaty’s optional protocol allowing individual 
complaints to proceed before international bodies for adjudication.133 
This is not to suggest that Cuban women have achieved full equality 
within Cuban society.134 However, efforts to integrate women into all 
levels of society and eliminate stereotypes through innovative and multi-
institutional means have yielded significant achievements.135 Women’s 
progress in education, employment, and health has been described as 
“enviable.”136 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women 
found that the Cuban revolution has “put [Cuban women] in a better po-
sition statistically than most of their Latin American counterparts,”137 and 
the status of women in Cuba compares favorably with industrialized ca-
pitalist countries.138 
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2. Domestic Violence Prevention and Intervention 
In Cuba, as elsewhere, the complexity of domestic violence is unders-
tood as arising from structural social relationships that include discrimi-
nation, isolation, and poverty.139 The FMC anticipated that domestic vi-
olence would cease with changed material conditions.140 However, with 
the recognition of the persistence of violence against women, that view-
point changed and the FMC urged greater attention to the issue.141 Activ-
ists argued that in order to fulfill the humanist social project, domestic 
violence had to be addressed not only because of its consequences for 
families, but because of the significance of nonviolence as a normative 
matter.142    
a. Definitions and Determinants 
Cubans generally adhere to the conventional definition of domestic vi-
olence as physical, emotional, and psychological violence committed 
within intimate relationships.143 However, social cohesion among neigh-
bors and established norms of gender equality have influenced the way 
Cubans conceive of the problem, which has led to expansion of the defi-
nition beyond paradigmatic characterizations. For example, Cubans have 
described domestic violence as harms that occur in other types of rela-
tionships (not just between intimates). Respondents asked to identify 
domestic violence in a 1993 study included not only disputes between 
intimate couples, but also arguments between coworkers, as well as ar-
guments between people while on shopping lines.144 
Similarly, behaviors beyond the prototypical acts usually associated 
with gender-based violence are considered forms of domestic violence.145 
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In a 1995 study, women respondents identified the most common form of 
gender-based violence as the imbalance in workload between men and 
women.146 Some cited the transmission of the HIV virus as a form of 
gender-based violence.147 Others have identified “the silent treatment,” 
where one partner stops talking with the other, as a particularly Cuban 
form of intimate violence.148 
There is general consensus among FMC organizers and scholars about 
the political and economic determinants of domestic violence.149 Writing 
for the Center for Legal Research of the Ministry of Justice, Caridad Na-
varette Calderón argues that the sources of domestic violence range from 
meta-systems (e.g., the U.S. embargo and its attendant deprivations and 
stress) to micro-systems and personal traits (e.g., socially constructed 
norms relating to male dominance and female submission).150 A similar 
point of view was repeated in interviews with the U.N. Special Rappor-
teur on Violence Against Women, during which Cubans expressed disa-
greement with the U.N. focus on individual violence experienced as 
physical, sexual, or psychological violence. The Cubans argued instead 
that it was a matter of violence against women that Cuban women suf-
fered from structural violence and economic exploitation largely as a 
result of U.S.-imposed economic sanctions.151 
Cuban experts rank socioeconomic conditions—particularly housing 
shortages, unemployment, low levels of education, poor health, and con-
sequential substance abuse—among the primary risk factors for domestic 
violence.152 These experts point to poor communication skills and low 
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self-esteem as personal contributing characteristics of a secondary na-
ture.153 These explanations share the premise that the sources of domestic 
violence are found in the social environment of daily life, rather than in 
individual characteristics and behavior. They are the framework by 
which Cubans endeavor to prevent and respond to domestic violence. 
b. Cuban Responses to Domestic Violence 
Cubans formulate their responses to domestic violence by starting with 
the conviction that the political and economic determinants of such be-
haviors must be addressed in a manner consistent with the prevailing 
views about ordinary crime. First, experts and policy makers emphasize 
the need for research and policy initiatives to address the sources of do-
mestic violence. Second, participatory organizations, particularly the 
FMC, summon their members to provide victims and perpetrators with a 
range of services.154 The third response involves legal action to promote 
the first two strategies by mandating research and prevention efforts.155 
Legal strategies, of course, also operate within the formal criminal justice 
system, but these too are designed to maximize services and integrate the 
perpetrator into the community. 
(1) Research and Policy Initiatives 
Theoretical criminology has had a direct and profound influence on 
domestic violence responses in Cuba. The National Commission on Pre-
vention and Social Attention (Comisiones de Prevención y Atención So-
cial) (“CPAS”) was created in 1986 to study the social aspects of crime 
and deviance.156 CPAS established a number of national multi-
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disciplinary research programs and working groups, including one on 
domestic violence.157 Much of the research currently focuses on gender 
norms and learned behaviors of men and women as the source of power 
imbalances that serve to legitimize domestic violence.158 
University departments have developed domestic violence research 
programs and frequently collaborate with international experts.159 Gov-
ernment offices, including the Attorney General’s Office (Oficina de 
Fiscalía General), the Ministry of Public Health, and the Ministry of Jus-
tice’s Center for Legal Research, have undertaken domestic violence re-
search initiatives.160 From 2002 to 2003, the Center for Psychological 
and Sociological Research (Centro de Investigaciones Psicológicas y 
Sociológicas) (“CIPS”) undertook a lengthy study of intra-family vi-
olence, and in the process, created survey instruments and methodologies 
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sion], 28 SEXOLOGÍA Y SOCIEDAD 9, 10 (2005), available at http://www.cenesex.sld.cu/ 
webs/mujeres_maltratadas.htm; Uriarte, supra note 74, at 121–22 (quoting one Cuban 
sociologist who calls for the “need to transform the existing thinking . . . of caring for 
people in a fragmented way and from the perspective of only one area . . . .”). 
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for ongoing examination of the issue.161 There is a continual call for 
more research and better data collection across several fields of study.162 
Over the past two decades, these studies have produced a new frame-
work for approaching the gender determinants of aggression, submission, 
and workplace and household roles.163 As noted by the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (in her review of developments 
in Cuba), CPAS has trained Cuban officials in matters relating to gender 
violence since the late 1990s.164 CPAS has also coordinated community 
organizations to conduct workshops and media campaigns to promote 
awareness and intervention in cases of domestic violence, with a focus 
on gender equality in spousal relationships.165 In 2006, CIPS developed 
curricular programs and training sessions for parents on the prevention of 
violent behavior within the family, including the disruption of gender-
determined power dynamics.166 Government agencies treat domestic vi-
olence as a public health problem and urge families and communities to 
alter patterns of patriarchal culture.167 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Cuban research findings is the ab-
sence of a call for more stringent application of criminal laws. Clotilde 
Proveyer Cervantes, one of Cuba’s most prominent experts in domestic 
violence, insists that legal sanctions must be the “last rung of the lad-
der”—that is, a last resort.168 Her view is that “criminal treatment is not 
the solution;” rather, the answer lies in “build[ing] other models of mas-
culinity and femininity that are not conflicting.”169 Her statements 
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represent the prevailing viewpoint, which is derived from theoretical de-
velopments that reflect Cuban political culture.170 
(2) Controlling Domestic Violence through Participatory Mechanisms 
As a result of Cuba’s political culture and the processes of the organi-
zations described in Part II, domestic violence cases are not easily hidden 
from neighbors, health care professionals, or community social work-
ers.171 Concepts of a cohesive Cuban society and the moral imperative of 
solidaridismo encourage intervention in a number of ways in the house-
hold, the neighborhood, and the workplace.172 Maintaining functional 
families is a priority in the culture of Cuban organizations.173 
The FMC has established “Casas de Orientación de Familia” (Family 
Orientation Houses) for victims of domestic violence. Although they do 
not provide alternative housing for victims, the Casas offer counseling 
and services related to job training and employment.174 FMC activists 
have also made use of the performing arts, television, and radio to pub-
licize the idea that gender roles are contributing factors of domestic vi-
olence, and to give a public voice to the victims and public attention to 
their suffering.175 The FMC also organizes self-help groups designed as 
alternatives to the formal legal system, specifically for male perpetra-
tors.176 The Center for Sex Education has also encouraged Cuban citizens 
to reconsider socially constructed forms of masculinity that are a risk 
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factor for violence and have participated in projects to that end.177 
Neighbors often intervene directly with abusers;178 according to one ex-
pert’s estimate, they do so in at least 90% of cases involving family vi-
olence.179 Furthermore, neighbors may bring perpetrators to FMC pro-
grams, and they frequently report abuse to family doctors, who rely on 
social workers to investigate and offer services.180 
Neighbors may also involve CDR officials, or even the police, at times. 
However, most individuals contact authorities for the purpose of encour-
aging the perpetrator to enter into an informal contract whereby he 
agrees to obtain help and change his behavior.181 Social sanctioning is 
not uncommon, and neighbors will keep watchful eyes on the home, par-
ticularly if they are concerned that the victim is not likely to come forth 
to complain.182 
c. Legal Responses 
Formal legal responses are constitutive of the political culture of par-
ticipation from which strategies of prevention and social control are de-
rived. The very organizations and commissions that study and coordinate 
responses to violence were created by legislation.183 For example, CPAS, 
which studies crime, including domestic violence, was mandated by 
law.184 Affirmative legal obligations in the 1975 Constitution and the 
Family Code include gender equality as a means to address the determi-
nants of gender violence.185 The People’s National Assembly Standing 
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Committee for Children, Young People and Equal Rights for Women is 
obligated by legislation to counsel, evaluate, research, study, and monitor 
matters related to domestic violence.186 Similarly, treaty obligations aris-
ing from CEDAW have inspired ongoing efforts relating to equal rights 
for women.187 
In the last decade, Cubans have given much attention to the implemen-
tation of formal criminal laws. Cuba has no specific crime of “domestic 
violence,” and this has caused concern and debate. Cuban experts recog-
nize the privileged position that criminal sanctions hold in most countries 
with regard to violence against women. They have been pressed by inter-
national observers to create specific provisions in the Penal Code to de-
fine and punish domestic violence.188 Some Cuban experts advocate spe-
cific domestic violence legislation as well as the establishment of a 
Family Court with the expertise to handle such matters.189 
In fact, the National Assembly has added various provisions to the 
Penal Code that do address violence against women.190 In 1997, lawmak-
ers amended the Code to increase punishment for trafficking in per-
sons.191 Two years later, in response to the debates about the lack of a 
specific domestic violence law, the National Assembly added violence 
between intimates as an aggravating factor to relevant code sections.192 
Criminologists have recommended additional legislation to address the 
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 187. Press Release: Cuba Striving Hard, supra note 123 (noting that Cuba created a 
national action plan as follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women; the plan 
has the status of a decision of the Council of State). 
 188. Interviews with law professor of the University of Havana in Havana, Cuba (Dec. 
23, 2002); see also Dixie Edith, Cuba: Violencia Doméstica en la Encrucijada de la Ley 
[Cuba: Domestic Violence at the Crossroads of the Law], Dec. 10, 2006, Nuevo Diario, 
http://www.nuevodiariodesalta.com.ar/diario/suplenotas.asp?825. 
 189. See Dixie Edith, Cuba: Se Necesita Una Legislación Específica [Cuba: Specific 
Legislation is Needed], MUJERESHOY, Mar. 19, 2007, http://www.mujereshoy.com/ 
secc_n/3649.shtml (noting one study where a majority of those interviewed thought that 
there should be a specific provision in the Penal Code related to domestic violence); Spe-
cial Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, ¶ 25. 
 190. In the past fifteen years, judges and police have received domestic violence train-
ing. See Raquel Sierra, Cuba: Evitar El Peor Rostro De La Violencia [Cuba: Avoiding 
the Worst Face of Violence], SEMLAC, Apr. 24, 2006, http://www.redsemlac.net/noticias/ 
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17, 1997). 
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adopted in February 1999, amending the Cuban Criminal Code). 
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need for self-defense-related laws for female defendants who commit 
crimes against their attackers.193 
Moreover, although Cubans reject the paradigm of criminal legal res-
ponses, such abusive actions are not without criminal penalties in some 
circumstances.194 However, in instances where a perpetrator is charged, 
prosecutors tend to view the criminal justice system as part of the 
“broader solidarity project,” wherein complainants are presumptively 
afforded credibility and respect and perpetrators are often viewed as in 
need of therapy and services.195 Prosecutors generally attempt to avoid 
imposing prison sentences in secure facilities, preferring instead to use 
reintegrative models. These models include what Cubans refer to as work 
camps or open prisons without cells, where defendants take classes and 
meet in groups, and may be required to report progress to the judge.196 
They often recommend that perpetrators be diverted to workplace groups 
to discuss gender violence or to the programs offered by the Casas de 
Orientación.197 
Certainly, some perpetrators are imprisoned.198 Convictions for rape 
and for physical assault carry sentences commensurate to the injury.199 
However, prosecutors trained in matters relating to family violence indi-
cate that there have been relatively few domestic violence prosecutions 
and fewer that result in imprisonment due to the preference for, and per-
ceived success of, alternative measures.200 
There is a particular idiom in Cuban criminology, one that invokes 
human dignity and reconcilability as premises of an approach to domes-
tic violence.201 The Cuban socialist system of justice differentiates itself 
from the world at large by focusing on prevention.202 Domestic violence 
is treated as a problem reflecting cumulative social circumstances, not 
                                                                                                             
 193. Characterization of Women Assaulters, supra note 64, at 255–56 (noting legal 
issues relating to women’s self-defense). 
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solely as an act of the individual who commits it.203 The prevailing per-
ception that domestic violence is caused by socioeconomic deprivation 
and culturally determined gender roles necessarily entails the view that 
individual punishment is unduly facile and often misplaced. Criminal 
sanctions remain subordinated to dominant approaches that rely on orga-
nizational networks whose members are well-situated to intervene in 
domestic violence matters.204 
This approach is not only consistent with Cuban political culture; it al-
so appears to be successful. Available data, including a Bureau of Justice 
report, demonstrate that rates of domestic violence are lower in Cuba 
than in the United States or other parts of Latin America.205 
B. Juvenile Delinquency 
1. Youth in Cuba: “If The Youth Fail, We All Fail”206 
The subject of juvenile delinquency must be considered in the context 
of the celebrated status accorded to youth in Cuba. Their importance has 
been recognized by scholars from within and without (and both on and 
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off) the island.207 Young Cubans were active in the overthrow of Batista 
and have since continued to participate in mass organizations and politi-
cal institutions.208 As one writer observed, the Cuban revolution was 
“made largely by and for the young people of the island.”209 
Youth have benefitted from the revolution. Regional and international 
health and human rights institutions that measure the wellbeing of child-
ren have praised Cuba for the accomplishments of its health care sys-
tem.210 Cuban health measures for children are not only better on average 
than those of all members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (“OECD”) and world averages generally, but they also 
surpass those of the high human development countries and are equal to 
or better than those of high-income OECD nations.211 
Education is the highest priority in Cuba.212 Cuban leaders consider 
education to be the foundational public good and the basis for achieving 
social justice and cultural development.213 The proportion of the national 
budget allocated for education is 13.5 percent, a significantly high figure, 
particularly for a small country.214 International observers have praised 
Cuban education programs at all levels, particularly the emphasis on ear-
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ly childhood development.215 The benefits of education have been wide-
spread and, notwithstanding instances of persisting racial discrimination, 
schooling has been a significant factor in diminishing racial inequality.216 
Researchers describe Cuban youth as generally possessing a strong sense 
of national identity and a self-image that comports with political and cul-
tural values.217 
2. Cuban Approaches to Juvenile Delinquency 
Cuba has maintained steady observation of youth development and de-
linquent behavior.218 Preoccupation with juvenile delinquency has in-
creased since the economic crisis of the 1990s, when the number of 
children on the streets rose.219 The Cuban leadership, concerned with 
deteriorating conditions and the threat of increasing economic disparities, 
turned its attention to strengthening social and political bonds between 
youth and the state and incorporating youth as “stake-holders” in the re-
volutionary project.220 As conditions in Cuba have changed, so too have 
strategies for dealing with the youth populations considered most vulner-
able.221 What has not changed, however, is Cuban refusal to link strate-
gies for combating delinquency with criminal and correctional justice 
strategies.222 
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a. “Preventive Work, Not Repression”223 
Preventive strategies have been the principal method of addressing the 
problem of juvenile delinquency, even as delinquency increased during 
the Special Period.224 The Ministry of Social Welfare coordinates preven-
tion efforts, working with national and regional assemblies, ministries, 
and mass organizations to assist in delinquency prevention efforts.225 
Government leaders use the state-run media to exhort citizens to help 
youths who exhibit troubling behavior, urging that such youths not be 
rejected.226 
Research has been an integral facet of Cuban prevention strategies.227 
As early as 1960, Cuba established the Center for the Evaluation, Analy-
sis and Guidance of Minors to study problems of juvenile crime.228 In 
1986, CPAS and the National Committee on Social Prevention and Child 
Care appointed experts to conduct research and make recommendations 
with regard to delinquency prevention.229 Similarly, the Ministries of the 
Interior and Education have established research centers to collaborate 
on approaches to juvenile crime.230 
Educators also play an important role in delinquency prevention, 
putting to use the values of Cuban participatory culture. Indeed, educa-
tors train volunteers to work with children in school and during after-
school activities.231 They emphasize humane education, affection, and 
nurturing.232 Sex education, principles of nonviolence, and public health 
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issues (such as drug abuse) are part of the curriculum.233 Teachers stress 
students’ individual and collective responsibilities and cultivate a culture 
of cooperation and solidarity within their classrooms as a means to dis-
courage criminal behavior.234 Punishment and threatening techniques are 
eschewed as ineffective and viewed as means by which violence is repli-
cated.235 
The institutions and organizations described in Part II of this Article 
play the central role in delinquency prevention strategies.236 The CDRs 
recruit retirees to provide supervision and guidance for children exhibit-
ing troubling behavior.237 Neighbors work with school personnel to iden-
tify truancy as well as its potential causes.238 Local prevention commis-
sions meet with citizens to address concerns about antisocial youth and 
to strategize about additional supervisory measures, including the devel-
opment of recreational and sports programs.239 CDR members seek solu-
tions to the more common problems that affect children’s success in 
school, including economic strain within families.240 The Unión de 
Jóvenes Comunistas (“UJC”) has engaged in a media campaign to link 
family violence to social violence, crime, and delinquency.241 
The Talleres have also addressed youth delinquency in community de-
velopment improvement projects. In an effort to incorporate youths into 
mainstream activities, workshops in the Havana neighborhood of Atares, 
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for example, offer disaffected youths the opportunity to participate in 
building restoration projects while engaging them in decision-making 
processes about larger community problems.242 The Casa del Niño y la 
Niña, a group started by a community development workshop that is 
supported by various ministries and institutes, provides services for 
children and families to improve the quality of life of children and ado-
lescents as part of prevention efforts.243 Other organizations, such as the 
Martin Luther King Center and the East Havana Cultural Centers, have 
developed a number of youth programs. These programs include sporting 
events, dance troupes that incorporate hip-hop, and other recreational 
activities, all as a way to create constructive opportunities for youths to 
participate and engage in change-making activities.244 
Health care providers are principal players in delinquency prevention 
efforts. They are integrated into the lives of families, and they regularly 
conduct evaluations of families’ social situations for evidence of eco-
nomic or psychic strain that might impact the wellbeing of children.245 
When signs of behavioral or substance abuse problems are noted, follow-
up services to ameliorate conditions are generally provided in the realm 
of public health.246 
These preventative approaches are based on the theory that delinquent 
behavior is learned and can be unlearned without stigmatizing delinquent 
youth.247 They reflect models propounded by prominent delinquency 
theorists who argue that a community’s ability to supervise youths 
through informal and supportive networks is key to controlling delin-
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quency.248 Cubans have supported these differential initiatives, which 
target young people for support and services in a manner consistent with 
Cuba’s norms and values.249 
b. Socialization and Social Work: Cuba’s Social Work Brigades 
Miren Uriarte has studied Cuba’s response to the economic crisis of 
the 1990s and has observed that social work strategies are the newest 
initiatives by which the government has attempted to transform itself to 
remain effective and efficient.250 Nowhere is this more apparent than Cu-
ba’s establishment of the Social Work Student Brigades, a key objective 
of which is to confront the problems associated with juvenile delinquen-
cy.251 
Beginning in 2001, Cuba established new centers affiliated with uni-
versities across the island for three related purposes: (1) to train young 
people as social workers for the purpose of re-incorporating them into 
educational settings; (2) to provide apprenticeship opportunities with 
assurances of employment upon completion of a brigade program; and 
(3) to augment resources to address social and economic problems, par-
ticularly those that contribute to delinquency.252 These centers have re-
cruited over 100,000 unemployed youths who had not finished their edu-
cation.253 Youths who receive social work training—young men and 
women who were themselves in need of services and may be exhibiting 
criminal behavior—receive stipends while they engage in work-study 
programs.254 They are eligible to attend university upon beginning their 
social work and are guaranteed paid work upon completing their pro-
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grams and returning to their communities.255 Between 2002 and 2007, 
380,000 new jobs for youths were created in education, health care, so-
cial work, computer technology, and other fields.256 
Brigade students work with vulnerable populations, including other 
youths, the elderly, families of the incarcerated, and individuals with 
criminal histories.257 Social work volunteers affiliated with the brigades 
identify minors engaged in antisocial acts and endeavor to manage their 
behavior through various social work strategies, including tutoring, 
placement in trade schools, and increased guidance and mentoring.258 
They work on a one-to-one basis to distribute services and otherwise 
create supportive environments as a means to intervene in criminal activ-
ity.259 Indeed, the central focus of the brigades is delinquency prevention 
through nurturing instead of punishment.260 
As one Cuban social worker noted, Cubans support the social work 
brigades as a desirable alternative to “repressive and coercive patterns in 
social control,” and they reject strategies based on the theory “that all 
social maladaptation merits punishment, or that public security necessi-
tates the separation of the socially maladapted from the social environ-
ment.”261 Social work brigades are perhaps the clearest example of a so-
cio-educational model that provides a range of services—education, 
health, and cultural development services, among others—and encourag-
es integration of troubled youth into Cuban society.262 Through the 
processes of social interaction around community problems, the social 
work brigades seek to inhibit problem behavior, incorporate youths into 
day-to-day life, and inculcate them with norms consistent with Cuban 
political culture. 
c. Legal Responses 
As noted above, Cuban policy makers have long been concerned with 
juvenile crime because of Cuba’s history of illiteracy, child mendicancy, 
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exploitation of child labor, and delinquency.263 Immediately upon assum-
ing power, the Cuban government reformed the juvenile delinquency 
system. In 1959, the National Assembly passed laws for the purpose of 
reeducating and rehabilitating youths classified as delinquents.264 Trained 
personnel were assigned to evaluate the social history and circumstances 
of youths facing criminal charges.265 Subsequently, juvenile delinquency 
matters were assigned to an integrated system of care staffed by experts 
and linked to university research centers.266 
Legal reforms have emphasized the protection of children over crimi-
nal sanctions that punish youth crime, and have mandated prevention 
efforts as the principal means to address juvenile delinquency.267 In 1978, 
the National Assembly enacted the Children and Youth Code268 to pro-
tect the rights of children to education, health (including physical educa-
tion), and other social services.269 In 1990, the Cuban government signed 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child270 and has since sought to im-
plement it through media campaigns, curricular instruction, public sector 
planning, and mass dissemination of information regarding treaty obliga-
tions.271 
Cuba amended its Constitution in 1992 to codify the obligations of 
parents to “assist the defense of . . . [the] legitimate interests” of their 
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children and to provide for the needs of youths in order to assure their 
proper development and wellbeing.272 More recently, Cuba amended its 
Criminal Code273 to protect children from sexual trafficking, pornogra-
phy, and corruption of minors.274 
The state does, when appropriate, bring criminal charges against 
youths who commit crimes considered antisocial and dangerous.275 The 
minimum age for criminal responsibility in Cuba is sixteen—same as the 
voting age.276 Youths under sixteen may not make confessions without a 
parent or legal guardian present.277 Unlike criminal courts in the United 
States, there is no juvenile division in the Cuban criminal system; how-
ever, the Cuban criminal process is different for youths than for adults.278 
For example, when charges are filed, a legal investigative team meets 
with an interdisciplinary group to examine the youth’s circumstances and 
to determine how best to intervene in family dynamics.279 Juveniles con-
victed between the ages sixteen and eighteen may not be imprisoned, but 
they may be confined to a boarding school or treatment facility.280 
Cuban legal scholars have acknowledged that there are still problems 
with respect to the administration of juvenile justice. Although there has 
been progress toward eliminating racial disparities in other realms, stu-
dies commissioned by the Attorney General’s office acknowledge the 
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overrepresentation of black and mulatto youths in the criminal justice 
system.281 Some have advocated additional reforms to improve the ad-
ministration of juvenile justice. For example, Dr. Ramón de la Cruz 
Ochoa, formerly Attorney General of Cuba and President of the Judiciary 
Commission of the National Assembly, has recommended further decri-
minalization of offenses.282 Other scholars have advocated increasing the 
minimum age for criminal responsibility to eighteen.283 
Cuban legal approaches to juvenile delinquency are perhaps best 
summed up by the Vice-Dean of the University of Havana’s law faculty. 
He has characterized the development of juvenile delinquency law re-
forms as an effort to strengthen the legal status of youths and to impose 
greater responsibility for their wellbeing, while limiting criminal justice 
intervention to “the bare minimum.”284 He has stressed that “the most 
significant characteristic of the Cuban model lies in the fact that respon-
sibility for treatment, evaluation[,] and effectuation is outside the domain 
of social institutions linked to correctional centers.” He has also said: 
A system for the care of minors with transgressive behavior depends 
upon a political will aimed at the elimination of causes and conditions 
that create a favorable milieu for delinquency within sectors of society. 
Nothing is solved by adopting new laws while maintaining unscathed 
the bases of inequality. For today’s Cuba, a main concern is the guaran-
tee of a system that gives priority attention to youth and children while 
working towards the elimination of social conditions that facilitate the 
emergence of damaging behavior.285 
Notwithstanding the need for improvement, crime (particularly juve-
nile crime) is again on the decline in Cuba.286 
IV. POLITICAL CULTURE AND ORDINARY CRIME: SOME COMPARISONS 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
The contrasts in the approaches to crime between Cuba and the United 
States are stark. For purposes of comparison, this Part describes some of 
the fundamental characteristics of the U.S. approach to crime (specifical-
ly, juvenile delinquency and domestic violence) and examines the wea-
kening of U.S. social structures that relate to the formation of social capi-
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tal and the impact of the demise of these structures on community crime 
control initiatives. 
Contrasts between the United States and Cuba, however, do not tell the 
whole story. Progressive U.S. criminologists share many of the views of 
their Cuban counterparts; they agree that the sources of crime are found 
principally in political and economic structural relations.287 A number of 
these theorists propound the view that community networks can function 
to harness norms and activate informal social controls in lieu of formal 
sanctions.288 
These theories gave rise in the 1980s to community-based programs—
often identified as Alternatives to Incarceration (“ATIs”). Many of these 
programs operate from the premise that there is a social context to indi-
vidual behavior, and their facilitators therefore endeavor to develop rela-
tionships with families and foster community support systems.289 Al-
though ATIs share some characteristics with the Cuban approach, they 
have not yet delivered on their promises. This Part concludes with a re-
view of the similarities between the two systems in order demonstrate 
how historical traditions and political culture both shape the success or 
failure of progressive crime prevention and control strategies.290 
A. Paradigms of Modern U.S. Criminology 
1. Fear and Loathing: The Carceral State 
U.S. approaches to ordinary crime, including domestic violence and 
juvenile delinquency, must be considered in light of the overall frame-
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work of U.S. criminology. The United States can best be described as a 
“prescriptive state”—one that relies primarily on state penal sanctions to 
enforce norms of behavior.291 The United States has the highest incarce-
ration rate in the world.292 There are 2.3 million people currently in pris-
ons and jails in the United States, a 500% increase since thirty years 
prior.293 Federal statutes have increased the numbers of crimes subject to 
the death penalty.294 New mandatory sentencing laws in all fifty states 
have resulted in the incarceration of people who previously would have 
received noncustodial sentences of probation.295 Some states have re-
vived the chain gangs of the Reconstruction era.296 Crime discourse is 
punctuated by analogies to war, with the criminal depicted as an enemy 
to be isolated and defeated.297 Fear of crime has resulted in increased 
surveillance; people once characterized as disorderly are now viewed as 
potential criminals to be aggressively controlled, if not removed, from 
mainstream life.298 
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This has been particularly true in regard to juveniles. Although early 
juvenile reformers rejected the criminal justice system as a means to era-
dicate delinquency, policies now emphasize punishment.299 Juvenile law 
scholars have demonstrated the ways that youths have been demonized in 
the United States; it makes for a stark comparison with the exalted posi-
tion of Cuban youths.300 Media have portrayed youths as superpreda-
tors.301 Politicians decry youthful offenders as “a more malevolent breed 
of offender than their predecessors,” and claim that today’s youths re-
quire more stringent sanctions, notwithstanding data to the contrary.302 
In the last twenty-five years, juvenile incarceration in the United States 
has increased by 43%.303 Sentences for youths are increasingly more pu-
nitive.304 At least one state has spent more on prisons than on higher edu-
cation.305 Despite guidelines limiting the use of pre-adjudication deten-
tion to ensure a juvenile’s appearance at trial or minimize the risk of re-
offense prior to disposition, youths are frequently detained for purposes 
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of punishment.306 Schools delegate their responsibilities for problem stu-
dents to the criminal justice system.307 Police are now deployed to handle 
behaviors once addressed by school principals.308 Metal detectors and 
video cameras have transformed spaces of education into sites of high 
security.309 In contrast with the Cuban approach that incorporates a spirit 
of faith in community efforts, the “nothing works” mantra popularized in 
the U.S. in the 1980s moved the country toward the paradigm of incapa-
citation.310 
An emphasis on punishment has similarly shaped the strategies and in-
formed the values of the U.S. legal system’s response to domestic vi-
olence.311 Feminist demands during the 1960s for legal parity of domes-
tic violence with other crimes found a receptive environment in the law-
and-order climate of the 1970s and 1980s.312   
In fact, recent research suggests that the sources of domestic violence 
are complex matters that cannot be readily resolved by the criminal jus-
tice system.313 These findings notwithstanding, policy makers continue to 
resort to law enforcement and prosecutorial strategies as the principal 
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responses to domestic violence.314 Domestic violence strategies are pri-
marily focused on individual transgressors and rely on idiosyncratic ex-
planations for abusive behaviors. Crime policies based on “[s]ituation 
and context-critical” theories that consider historical, social, economic, 
and cultural circumstances have been largely ignored.315 In contrast with 
the Cuban approach, U.S. advocates have largely dismissed as inappro-
priate the efficacy of family and community systems as methods of in-
tervention.316 Policy and legislative developments have resulted in higher 
rates of arrest for domestic assault as compared to non-domestic assault, 
including an increased rate of arrest of women.317 
These developments reflect a shift to “the carceral society,” characte-
rized by an increase in disciplinary and monitoring strategies and the 
professionalization of punishment.318 Whereas the research of Cuban 
criminologists is framed as “humanistic projects,” criminology in the 
United States operates largely within a technocratic criminal justice sys-
tem embedded in what David Garland identifies as “the culture of con-
trol.”319 Punishment has developed as the normative response of choice, 
even as it drains community resources.320 The paradigm of mass incarce-
ration has thus served to create the largest prison population in the world, 
a development that has gone largely unchallenged within the dominant 
institutions that set policy and control crime responses.321 Indeed, one 
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study found that rates of incarceration go up whether crime is decreasing 
or increasing.322 
The increase in incarceration rates is due to a political culture that is 
driven more by zeal for punishment than social science data.323 As Jona-
than Simon has noted, “crime has become a privileged rationale and ra-
tionality for governing.”324 The specter of crime often precipitates public 
outrage disproportionate to the actual danger posed by criminals.325 
2. The Dissipation of Social Capital 
An examination of civic participation in the United States reveals fur-
ther differences between U.S. and Cuban approaches to ordinary crime. 
As in Cuba, the development of social capital through civic organiza-
tions, clubs, and neighborhood associations directly bears on rates of 
crime in the United States.326 Trusting relationships between neighbors, 
friendship networks, and civic engagement with a wide range of groups 
are all factors that act to mitigate criminal behavior.327 However, mem-
bership in these types of associations has declined since the early 
1970s.328 In his groundbreaking study, Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam 
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describes the dramatic decrease in citizen participation in community 
affairs and relational networks upon which norms of reciprocity are es-
tablished.329 Theda Skocpol notes the shift to memberless associations 
that are professionally driven and managed.330 
The correlation between civic disengagement and the deterioration of 
civil society with high rates of incarceration is well-established.331 As 
incarceration rates increase, social capital further dissipates. Families are 
impacted by the imprisonment of (mostly) young men often at great dis-
tances from their homes. The negative effects of incarceration are often 
compounded by the social, economic, and legal stigmas associated with 
criminal records. These dynamics impact social cohesion and limit the 
capacity of communities to create associational networks. Simply stated, 
community residents confront reduced opportunities to build relation-
ships and develop social capital.332 
Moreover, neighborhood groups that are created for the purpose of re-
ducing crime but that function within a criminal justice framework that 
favors incarceration often inhibit the development of trusting relation-
ships.333 For example, in most neighborhoods, crime watch programs 
serve as hotlines to the police and enlist residents to assist in criminal 
justice surveillance and arrest activities.334 In neighborhoods already dis-
rupted by high rates of imprisonment, such organizations are more likely 
to decrease the willingness of residents to intervene in crime prevention 
activities. To be sure, in neighborhoods where young men, especially 
blacks and Latinos, are disproportionately incarcerated and removed 
from their communities, the very legitimacy of informal social controls is 
undermined.335 
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The fact is that in the United States, state institutional mechanisms are 
more likely to be emphasized than social solidarity in crime prevention 
efforts. These circumstances create structural obstacles to progressive 
crime reform. It is within this context that progressive alternatives such 
as ATIs function. 
3. ATIs: Arrested Development and Net-Widening 
ATIs emerged in the 1980s in response to two factors: the alarming 
growth of prison populations and the promise of the effectiveness of su-
pervision and treatment plans for criminals.336 Proponents envisioned 
ATIs as a means to break from imprisonment as the default response to 
lawbreaking.337 ATI programs typically include rehabilitation-oriented 
programming (notably drug treatment), new methods of accountability 
(such as restorative justice approaches and community service), and new 
methods of supervision (such as home confinement and electronic moni-
toring).338 
Notwithstanding the specific goal of ATIs of avoiding the use of incar-
ceration, they remain inexorably implicated in the dominant paradigm of 
the criminal justice system and function within the legal constraints of 
mandatory sentences.339 The issue is not one of effectiveness. Recidivism 
rates for ATI participants are comparable or better than similarly situated 
incarcerated people.340 However, most individuals referred to ATIs face 
misdemeanor or low-level felonies and are not likely candidates for in-
carceration in the first place.341 Those who face the greatest risk of incar-
ceration are typically considered ineligible for most ATIs.342 
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ATIs further depend on a broad range of social services to assist with 
housing, education, health care, and mental health programs, without 
which the very premise of their efforts is compromised. But over the past 
two and half decades, public support for these types of social services 
has decreased.343 Without this support system, ATIs are unable to offer 
the full range of services upon which their clients depend. Drug treat-
ment programs, for example, are in short supply, despite their promise in 
reducing crime and recidivism.344 Moreover, as noted above, the United 
States has suffered a decline in social capital network opportunities of 
the type upon which ATIs rely to function effectively within communi-
ties.345 
Despite their stated purposes, ATIs have in some instances actually 
contributed to increased incarceration.346 Many individuals who are 
enrolled in ATIs face heightened scrutiny and supervision for behaviors 
that would otherwise not be considered law-breaking.347 ATI clients are 
required to report to parole officers, refrain from contact with convicted 
felons, and remain employed or actively looking for work.348 These con-
ditions may be an appropriate exchange for avoiding imprisonment. 
However, imposition of custodial sentences that would have otherwise 
been ordered is not the only consequence for violating these require-
ments. ATI participants are likely to be sentenced to even harsher penal-
ties, often without due process protections, as additional punishment for 
failing to succeed in their programs.349 
ATIs have suffered significant setbacks in efforts to transform the  
dominant carceral culture. They function within a political culture that 
privileges the formal criminal justice system in general and incarceration 
in particular as a response to crime. In contrast with Cuban participatory 
mechanisms that promote civic responsibility for the redistribution of 
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public goods, ATIs have fewer moral resources to draw upon. In a larger 
sense, the comparison with the Cuban approach to crime serves to un-
derscore the need to consider political culture; otherwise—good inten-
tions notwithstanding—it may be impossible to develop progressive 
crime policies.350 In the end, ATIs may simply “redistribut[e] . . . penal 
power into a wider social space.”351 
CONCLUSION  
The Cuban revolutionary project has entered its fiftieth year—time  
sufficient to reflect on efforts to deploy values embedded in political cul-
ture as the normative determinants of social relationships. It is the very 
nature of the Cuban political culture of morality and its “place-bound 
source of self-identification” that offer insight into the differences in so-
cial control that set Cuba apart from the United States.352 Cubans assume 
responsibility for crime “as an expression of a more responsible and par-
ticipatory concept of life in a collectivity,” and as “an expression of a 
cultural pattern more sensitive to the social order.”353 
David Garland describes the social control mechanisms that inform 
U.S. criminal justice policies as a reflection of social and economic 
changes of late capitalism, such as the transformation from manufactur-
ing to service, the increase in income inequality, and other consequences 
of globalization and the attending insecurity and deterioration of public 
goods.354 But Cuba, too, has undergone significant economic dislocation 
in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It too has suf-
fered widening inequalities as Soviet assistance and subsidized petro-
leum imports disappeared. But in Cuba’s appeal to political and cultural 
metavalues, moral purpose—having become a prominent facet of surviv-
al strategies, especially during the 1990s—has served to offset material 
adversity. By invoking an ethical political culture, realized through long-
standing social practices of civic participation, Cubans have maintained 
social structures designed to inhibit conditions that give rise to crime and 
deviance while supporting the most vulnerable populations. 
In contrast, in a society that “governs through crime,”355 both poverty 
and crime are characterized as the results of individual choices made by 
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unworthy deviants, and this in turn justifies policies that undermine the 
efficacy of publicly supported prevention services and encourages the 
use of punitive responses.356 The success of progressive crime control 
strategies, such as ATIs, as meaningful alternatives to the carceral state, 
requires a fundamental political and cultural shift through which social 
and community relationships must be redefined and restructured. Such 
efforts, however, have been neither successful nor sustained.357 Ultimate-
ly, changes in U.S. approaches to ordinary crime necessitate a broad 
change in political culture. 
As the opening epigraphs to this Article suggest, the contrast in politi-
cal culture between the United States and Cuba is vast. In the United 
States, the state freely exercises its control in the sphere of punishment 
but is restrained from interfering with the distribution of material goods 
and services, whereas the Cuban state readily intervenes in the former 
while encouraging informal social controls in response to crime.358 For 
those who agree that values such as reciprocity, community, cooperation, 
and solidarity are essential to enlightened criminal justice policies, the 
Cuban approach holds promising relevance. 
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